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ARTICLE 
MARRIAGE AND INEVITABILITY: 
A LESSON FROM MARYLAND 
By: William C. Duncan* 
"'Mr. Kenge, ' said Allan, appearing enlightened all in a moment. 
'Excuse me, our time presses. Do I understand that the whole estate is 
found to have been absorbed in costs?' 'Hem! I believe so, 'returned 
Mr. Kenge."\ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the ongoing litigation over the meaning of marriage drags into its fourth decade, the legal dispute is beginning to rival Charles 
Dickens' fictional case Jarndyce and Jarndyce in longevity.2 Like 
that chancery case, it too has raised high expectations of a favorable 
outcome that will vindicate the hopes of its proposed beneficiaries. 
At the present time, the focus of the ongoing debate over the 
definition of marriage is centered on California, where a major federal 
case tests the constitutionality of the state's marriage law. 3 Maryland 
was once the site of a similar courtroom battle, though on a smaller 
scale.4 That battle, however, deserves more attention as it, along with 
similar decisions from other states, will likely prove in the future to be 
more influential both within and beyond the state than currently 
imagined. 
This article will carefully examine the Maryland case in the context 
of four decades of litigation over the definition of marriage. It will 
utilize a close reading of the trial court and Court of Appeals of 
Maryland decisions to elucidate important questions about marriage 
and the law. 
II. CONTEXT FOR CONAWAY V. DEANE5 
Maryland's seminal same-sex marriage case was decided in 2007, 
but was only a skirmish in a much larger battle taking place in courts, 
* William C. Duncan is the Director of the Marriage Law Foundation. 
1 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 835 (Heritage Press 1942)(1853). 
2 Id. at 18-19. 
3 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F .3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). 
4 Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007). 
5 Id. 
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in legislatures, and at the ballot box over a period now stretching forty 
years.6 
In the wake of Loving v. Virginia,7 a same-sex couple in Minnesota 
sought a marriage license from their local clerk hoping that the right to 
marry discussed in Loving would be extended to include a right to an 
entirely novel definition of marriage. 8 The lawsuit that ensued was 
appealed to the Minnesota and United States Supreme Courts, with the 
former rejecting all of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims9 and the 
latter dismissing "for want of a substantial federal question,,,IO which 
is a decision on the merits. I I For the next two decades, there were 
only sporadic attempts to establish legal recognition of same-sex 
marriages through litigation. 12 
Not until the 1990s did a lawsuit alleging that state marriage laws 
were unconstitutional for failure to allow same-sex couples to get 
marriage licenses seem likely to succeed. In 1993, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court narrowly ruled that the state's marriage law was 
presumptively unconstitutional, though the court also remanded to 
allow the state to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the 
current law. 13 This decision, along with a similar trial court ruling in 
Alaska,14 was preempted by an amendment to the state constitution. IS 
Ten years later, litigants finally secured a victory in Massachusetts, 
where the supreme judicial court ruled the state's marriage definition 
lacked even a rational basis. 16 At around the same time, the United 
States Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting 
sodomy. 17 
The conjunction of these rulings suggested to some that the time 
was right for a major effort to secure same-sex marriage through 
6 See William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social 
Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004) (discussing the history of same-sex marriage 
litigation from 1971 to 2003). 
7 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
8 Bakerv. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
9 ld. 
10 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
11 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). 
12 See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 
(1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); DeSanto v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d 
952,952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), 
denying cert. to, No. 43391, 1974 WL 45234 (Wash. Oct. 10,1974). 
13 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,67-68 (Haw. 1993). 
14 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
15 HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also ALASKA CONST. art. J, § 25. 
16 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
17 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,562,566 (2003). 
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strategic litigation throughout the United States. Advocates of 
redefinition believe that same-sex marriage is inevitable and that it is 
time for many more states to embrace the future of marriage. Thus, 
litigation began in a series of states chosen for their likelihood of 
accepting claims for same-sex marriage. It has long been a tactic of 
same-sex marriage advocates to litigate in states based on "the 
political climate in the state" and "perhaps most important, the 
composition of the state judiciary.,,18 As one legal activist noted, 
"'[t]he lawsuits we have done that have succeeded have been carefully 
planned and brought in states where we already had the legal building 
blocks by doing work on other issues.",19 Another legal activist 
explained that "the lawsuits are focused on states where public 
attitudes toward same-sex unions seem particularly friendly and where 
amending the state constitution to counter any ruling for same-sex 
marriage would be difficult. ,,20 
Maryland was among the states chosen through this forum 
shopping process for litigation in the post-Goodridge wave.21 Suits 
were also filed in New York,22 Washington,23 Connecticut24 and 
Iowa.25 Also in the wake of the Massachusetts decision, the mayor of 
San Francisco began offering marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
precipitating a lawsuit to clarify his authority to determine the state's 
marriage law?6 This, in turn, led to a lawsuit regarding whether the 
state's marriage definition, enacted by voter initiative in 2000, violated 
California's constitution. 27 
For those who believed the time had come for same-sex marriage, 
the results were mixed. Over the next few years, the high courts of 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa all ruled that marriage redefinition 
was mandated by their state constitutions.28 In contrast, the high 
18 Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay 
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567,611 n.194 
(1994). 
19 Wyatt Buchanan, Profound Issues in Seattle Lawsuit; State high court set to rule on 
gay rights, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2006, at Al (quoting Jennifer Pizer). 
20 Joan Biskupic, Wave of Lawsuits Targets Bans on Same-Sex Marriage, Challenges 
argue some states' constitutions include right to gay and lesbian nuptials, USA TODAY, Mar. 
24, 2006, at 4A. 
21 See Conaway, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (addressing a challenge to the denial of 
marriage licenses to certain same-sex couples). 
22 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). 
23 Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 968 (Wash. 2006). 
24 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008). 
2S Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
26 Lockyer v. City and Cnty. ofS.F., 95 P.3d 459,462 (Cal. 2004). 
27 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,397 (Cal. 2008). 
28 Id. at 400-02; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872. 
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courts of Maryland, New York, and Washington ruled that defining 
marriage solely as the union of a husband and wife was consistent with 
their state constitutions.29 Interestingly, in each state where the court 
has ruled that marriage laws are unconstitutional, the state attorney 
general either decided not to participate in defending the state's 
marriage law, as was the case in Iowa, or to only raise pro forma 
arguments and even disavow the kinds of arrments accepted in the 
states where courts upheld the marriage laws.3 
The continued intransigence of citizens to accept the new marital 
regime has further complicated the preferred narrative of the ever-
increasing acceptance of same-sex marriage. As previously noted, the 
people of Hawaii and Alaska approved amendments to their 
constitutions and either reserved to the legislature the definition of 
marriage (Hawaii) or preserved the impugned definition of marriage 
(Alaska) after adverse decisions by courts in those states. 
Subsequently, twenty-eight additional states amended their 
constitutions to define marriage.3l Prominent among these is 
California. After the California Supreme Court ordered a redefinition 
of marriage, citizen groups quickly proposed Proposition 8, an 
amendment to the state constitution approved by voters in November 
2008.32 In November 2010, all three members of the Iowa Supreme 
Court who had joined the opinion ruling Iowa's marriage law 
unconstitutional, who were also on the ballot for retention, were voted 
out of office-an extremely unusual development.33 
29 Conaway, 401 Md. at 325, 903 A.2d at 635; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12; Andersen, 
138 P.3d at 1010. 
30 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 523-24 n.15; Varnum, 
763 N.W.2d at 869. 
31 ALA. CON ST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art I, 
§ 4, para. I; IDAHO CONST. art. Ill, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; Ky. CONST. § 233A; LA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. ch.l, art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A; Mo. 
CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 7; NEB. CON ST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 
21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § II; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. 
CONST. Art. XV, § 5a; S.c. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. CONST. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. 
XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; UTAH CON ST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. 
CONST. art. XIII, § 13. After the Maine Legislature passed a bill defining marriage as the 
union of any two people, voters rejected the law in a November 2009 referendum. Abby 
Goodnough, A Setback in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law Expands, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ20091ll/05/us/politics/ 
05maine.html? r=3. 
32 CAL. CaNST. art. I, § 7.5. As noted above, this amendment has been challenged in 
federal court. See generally supra note 3, at 927. 
33 See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Judges, Politicizing Rulings on 
Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-
dyn/contentlarticlel20 I 01ll/031 AR20 10 110307058.html. 
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III. MARYLAND: INTERRUPTING INEVITABILITY 
The context surrounding the Maryland marriage decision illustrates 
some important tensions in the ongoing marriage debate. 
First is the gap between the claim of inevitability and reality. The 
proponents of same-sex marriage explain their efforts in terms of 
inevitability-that Americans are belatedly becoming enlightened and 
accept the reality that "marriage equality" is an unavoidable feature of 
the family law of the future. This follows from the idea that 
redefinition is a fundamental right. If something is a fundamental 
right that right must be respected and, indeed will be, even if it may 
take time for full acceptance. The inevitability argument for same-sex 
marriage is premised on this precise belief. 
The inevitability theme, however, is just inconsistent with recent 
experience. There is strong evidence that same-sex marriage is 
anything but inevitable, as we've seen in the Maryland case. 
The second tension springs from the nature of the inevitability 
argument and, particularly, from its presuppositions as to rights. The 
inevitability narrative stigmatizes opponents of the marriage change by 
positing that people who oppose the "fundamental right" of same-sex 
marriage are bigots or discriminators, akin to those who believe that 
one race is superior to another. Shifting the focus of marriage to the 
straw man of individual rights shuts down discussion of the potential 
consequences and ramifications of the change in marriage. 
Thus, interrupting the inevitability theme may allow for an open 
evaluation of the consequences and a discussion of the risks and trade-
offs inherent in the redefinition of marriage to include same-sex 
couples. To the degree such a theme is accepted, however, this type of 
analysis is unlikely ever to occur, with ramifications and consequences 
only becoming clear later when retrenching is much more difficult. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Conaway v. 
Deane, like similar decisions in Washington and New York and along 
with the explosion of state marriage amendments, makes two things 
clear. First, same-sex marriage is not an inevitable development as an 
empirical matter. In other words, the idea that redefining marriage is a 
foregone conclusion because it is so clearly a constitutional right is 
inconsistent with reality. 
This first point is somewhat obvious. Where the majority of 
appellate decisions assessing the question have ruled that marriage 
laws defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman are 
constitutional and where the overwhelming majority of states have 
either amended their constitutions to protect this understanding of 
marriage, seen their citizens vote to reject same-sex marriage, or have 
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either statutes or court decisions defining marriage as the union of a 
man and woman, same-sex marriage is hardly inevitable. Similarly, 
the Maryland decision in Conaway v. Deane is evidence of that fact. 
Second, a careful analysis of the claims for and against redefining 
marriage, elucidated by the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals 
decisions in Conaway v. Deane, illustrates the risks inherent in 
accepting the idea that redefinition is akin to a foregone conclusion 
just waiting for enshrinement in the law. As already noted, claiming 
that an assertion is actually a fundamental right creates a risk that 
discussion will end and, thus, that important social interests will be 
slighted by courts and legislators swayed by the inevitability 
argument. 
To understand this second point, that failing to examine the logic of 
redefinition will have consequences, requires a close analysis of the 
competing court decisions. The contrast between the competing 
decisions illuminates what is lost when claims for redefinition as an 
inevitable triumph of human rights are accepted. 
In Deane v. Conaway, nine same-sex couples and one individual 
who desired the right to marry another man, sued county clerks from 
various parts of Maryland who had denied marriage licenses to the 
couples after they had applied. 34 The couples claimed to be 
"representative" of other such couples in Maryland who have suffered 
"legal, financial, and emotional harm as a result of the same-sex 
prohibition" implicit in the state's definition of marriage. 35 They 
claimed that they would have received licenses "but for their sexual 
identities.,,36 
The couples asserted four claims in their challenge to Maryland's 
marriage laws: that the law discriminated on the basis of gender in 
violation of the state's Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), that the 
law discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the law 
violated their fundamental right to marry under both the equal 
protection and due process provisions ofthe state constitution.37 
The Circuit Court focused its analysis on the first claim. 38 The 
court began by holding that the marriage law constituted facial sex 
34 Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145, at *1-2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 
20,2006). 
35 Id. at *l. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at *3. 
38 See generally id. at *3-9 (demonstrating how the majority of the opinion was spent 
discussing this particular argument). 
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discrimination.39 In the court's description, "[t]he relative genders of 
the two individuals are facts that lie at the very center of the matter; 
those whose genders are the same as their intended spouses may not 
marry, but those whose genders are different from their intended 
spouse may.,,40 Thus, to the court, "the relative genders of a same-sex 
couple are the very crux of the matter.,,4! Accordingly, since a woman 
could marry a male partner and a man could not "marry that same 
male partner" (assuming this does not involve polygamy), "compared 
to the woman, the man is disadvantaged solely because of his sex.'.42 
The court posits an analogy it finds "striking" to an earlier Maryland 
case in which a Maryland court transferred custody of daughters from 
the father to the mother because it believed the mother would better 
parent the daughters.43 
Having decided the Maryland marriage law constituted sex 
discrimination, the trial court explained that strict scrutiny analysis 
was appropriate under the state ERA. 44 This conclusion was 
superfluous, however, because the court could find: 
no apparent compelling state interest in a statutory prohibition 
of same-sex marriage discriminating, on the basis of sex, 
against those individuals whose gender is identical to their 
intended spouses. Indeed, this Court is unable to even find that 
the prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally relates to a 
I .. . 45 eglt1mate state mterest. 
The clerks argued that, in the court's characterization, "promoting 
the traditional family unit, in which the heterosexual parents are 
married, and encouraging procreation and child-rearing within this 
traditional unit,,46 was a legitimate state interest served by the marriage 
law, and the plaintiffs "do not contend that these are not legitimate 
39 Id. at *3. 
40 Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *3. 
41 Id. at *4. 
42 Id. at *5. This line of reasoning is potentially limitless. For instance, could not one 
claim that the law limiting each person to one spouse constituted marital status 
discrimination? Following the court's logic, "but for" being married one would be free to 
marry another person. Thus, if one is single, one could marry, but if one is married, one could 
not. Again, following the court's logic, the only thing separating a person seeking 
polyamorous marriage and a single person who can marry is marital status and, hence, 
discrimination. The same could be said of age or relationship as well-all of which is to say 
that the court's logic is more circular than illuminating. 
43 Id. at *6 (citing Griffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1998». 
44 Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *6. 
45 !d. at *7. 
46 !d. 
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state interests.,,47 The court, however, said there was "no rational 
connection between the prevention of same-sex marriages and an 
increase or decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages or of 
children born to those unions.,,48 The court says the law is based on 
overly broad assumptions about "the optimal environment for 
procreation" and that "the Legislature has little experience with same-
sex marriage,,49 so its grocreational purpose cannot be linked to the 
definition of marriage. The court also claims that if the legislature 
were to justify its marriage law it "would have to have concluded that 
children raised by opposite-sex married couples are better-off than 
children raised by same-sex married couples,,51 and to do so "may 
have assumed that opposite-sex marriages less frequently end in 
divorce, that opposite-sex couples are better parents, or that opposite-
sex couples focus more on their children's education.,,52 The court 
says that these assumptions "are broad unsupported generalizations" 
and, thus, cannot justify the marriage law.53 
The court then summarily disposes of the clerks' claim that the 
marriage law is justified by the need to keep Maryland law uniform 
with the law of other states and of the United States.54 It argues that 
giving the benefits of marriage, but not the status, to same-sex couples 
would not be an appropriate solution to the problem identified by the 
court.55 Doing so would simply demonstrate the irrationality of the 
distinction since, if statutes "make a married couple and a non-married 
couple essentially equivalent with respect to the effects of marriage, 
47 ld. 
48 ld. 
49 ld. It is very difficult to understand what the court means by this. It seems to be 
suggesting that if the Legislature knew more about same-sex marriage it would come to a 
different conclusion. But on what authority can the court possibly make such a claim? If this 
is what the court means, then any novel legal claim would have to be accepted since the 
Legislature would always be lacking in experience with the change and could thus not 
rationally arrive at reasons for preventing it. A more troubling possibility is that the court is 
suggesting that only it is equipped to know the implications of redefining marriage without 
experience, unlike the legislature that needs specific experience to comprehend them. The 
court then follows this interesting assertion by noting that under the rational basis test, the 
legislature can justifY its -actions by "rational speculation" and "does not need evidentiary 
support." ld. at *8. This statement, of course, directly contradicts the assertion regarding 
evidence. 
50 Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *7. 
51 ld. at *8. 
52 ld. It is of course, highly ironic that the court fmds fault with the legislature for 
engaging in broad generalizations when it is basing its conclusion on assumptions of what the 
legislature might have assumed. 
53 ld. 
54 ld. 
55 Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *9. 
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there simply is no rational reason to prevent the marriage.,,56 The 
court ends by rejecting a claim that, in the court's words, the marriage 
law is justified by an interest in "promoting and preserving 
legislatively expressed societal values" because, to the court, "tradition 
and social values alone cannot support adequately a discriminatory 
statutory classification. ,,57 
The Court of Appeals took the case directll without waiting for an 
appeal through the Court of Special Appeals. 5 The majority began its 
legal analysis by directly addressing the sex discrimination claim. 59 
The court noted that Maryland sex discrimination precedent "involved 
legislative classifications that gave certain rights to an entire class of 
men or women, to the exclusion of the opposite sex" thus making 
these cases distinguishable from Maryland's marriage law "that, on its 
face, applies equally to the members of both sexes.,,60 The court 
examined in considerable detail the legislative history of the state and 
proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment, including 
contemporaneous arguments offered in support of ratification in 
Maryland. 61 The court concluded that "the primary purpose of the 
ERA was to eliminate discrimination as between men and woman as a 
class.,,62 The court previously had occasion to apply the ERA in other 
cases and noted that "our applications of the ERA indicate that its 
primary purpose was to remedy the long history of subordination of 
women in this country, and to place men and women on equal ground 
as pertains to the enjoyment of basic legal rights under the law.,,63 
Having examined both sources of interpretation, the court concluded 
"the Legislature's and electorate's ultimate goal in putting in place the 
Maryland ERA was to put men and women on equal ground, and to 
subject to closer scrutiny any governmental action which sin,rled out 
for disparate treatment men or women as discrete classes.,,6 Thus, 
unless a challenged statute "grants, either on its face or in application, 
rights to men or women as a class, to the exclusion of an entire 
subsection of similarly situated members of the opposite sex, the 
provisions of the ERA are not implicated and the statutory 
classification under review is subjected to rational basis scrutiny, 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Conaway, 401 Md. at 238,932 A.2d at 581. 
59 Id. at 244, 932 A.2d at 585. 
60 Id. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586 n.14. 
61 Id. at 246-72, 932 A.2d at 587-603. 
62 Id. at 250, 932 A.2d at 589. 
63 Id. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591. 
64 Conaway, 401 Md. at 260,932 A.2d at 596. 
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unless there exists some other reason to apply heightened scrutiny. ,,65 
Applied to the state's marriage law, the court found it did: 
not separate men and women into discrete classes for the 
purpose of granting to one class of persons benefits at the 
expense of the other class. Nor does the statute, facially or in 
its application, place men and women on an uneven playing 
field. Rather, the statute prohibits equally both men and 
women from the same conduct. 66 
The court specifically rejected the trial court's assignment of 
almost totemic significance to the mere mention of sex in the law: "a 
statute does not become unconstitutional simply because, in some 
manner, it makes reference to race or sex.,,67 
The court also rejected the analogy to Loving v. Virginia as 
"inapt.,,68 The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in 
Loving "determined that, although the statute applied on its face 
equally to all races, the underlying purpose was to sustain White 
Supremacy and to subordinate African-Americans and other non-
Caucasians as a class.,,69 So, for the court, "[a]bsent some showing 
that [the marriage law] was 'designed to subordinate either men to 
women or women to men as a class,' . . . we find the analogy to 
Loving inapposite.,,7o 
Having disposed of the sex discrimination claim, the court turned to 
the claim of sexual orientation discrimination. The court said the 
marriage law "does differentiate implicitly on the basis of sexual 
preference" but that such a category "is neither a suspect nor quasi-
suspect class" subject to rational basis review.7l The court admitted 
that: 
[h]omosexual persons have been the object of societal 
prejudice by private actors as well as by the judicial and 
legislative branches of federal and state governments. Gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual persons likewise have been subject to 
unique disabilities not truly indicative of their abilities to 
contribute meaningfully to society. 72 
65 Jd. at 263-64,932 A.2d at 597-98. 
66 Jd. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598. 
67 Id. at 268-69, 932 A.2d at 600. 
68 Jd. at 268, 932 A.2d at 600. 
69 Id. at 269, 932 A.2d at 60 I. 
70 Conaway, 401 Md. at 270,932 A.2d at 601 (quoting Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11). 
71 Jd. at 277,932 A.2d at 605-06. 
72 Id. at 282,932 A.2d at 609. 
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The court held, however, that "we are not persuaded that gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual persons are so politically powerless that they are entitled 
to 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. ",73 
The court noted that "at least in Maryland, advocacy to eliminate 
discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons based on 
their sexual orientation has met with growing successes in the 
legislative and executive branches of government," referencing anti-
discrimination provisions in state code and regulations that include 
sexual orientation.74 The court also said that given "the scientific and 
sociological evidence currently available to the public, we are unable 
to take judicial notice that gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons display 
readily-recognizable, immutable characteristics that define the group 
such that they may be deemed a suspect class.,,75 Further, the court 
noted that the plaintiffs "point neither to scientific nor sociological 
studies, which have withstood analysis for evidentiary admissibility, in 
support of an argument that sexual orientation is an immutable 
characteristic." 76 
In its analysis of the argument that same-sex marriage was a 
fundamental right, the court said it could not rest on a "brief 
invocation of the cases outlining the importance of marriage generally 
and the other liberty interests that make up the fundamental rights 
panorama of personal autonomy.,,77 Instead, the court agreed with 
other appellate courts "that the issue is framed more properly in terms 
of whether the right to choose same-sex marriage is fundamental.,,78 
The court noted that the right-to-marry cases "infer that the right to 
marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature of 
the relationshir and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of 
our species.,,7 Specifically, "virtually every Supreme Court case 
recognizing as fundamental the right to marry indicates as the basis for 
the conclusion the institution's inextricable link to procreation, which 
necessarily and biologically involves participation (in ways either 
intimate or remote) by a man and a woman.,,80 The court accepted that 
"this latitudinously-stated right to marry" is fundamental, but the court 
noted that marriage "is nevertheless a public institution that 
73 ld. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611 (internal citation omitted). 
74 ld., 932 A.2d at 611. 
75 ld. at 291, 932 A.2d at 614. 
76 Conaway, 401 Md. 292, 932 A.2d 615. 
77 ld. at 297-98,932 A.2d at 618. 
78 ld. at 299, 932 A.2d at 619. 
79 ld. at 299-300, 932 A.2d at 619. 
80 ld. at 302, 932 A.2d at 621. 
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historically has been subject to the regulation and police powers of the 
State.,,81 Thus, "the fundamental right to marry is not absolute" with 
regulations related to age, relationship, and competency, and there is 
no precedent for a fundamental right to marry the person of one's 
choice despite that person being "lineally and directly related.,,82 The 
court concluded that a right to same-sex marriage is not "so deeply 
imbedded in the history, tradition, and culture of this State and Nation 
that it should be deemed fundamental.,,83 Examining "the current 
economic, political, and social climate" the court said it was 
"unwilling to hold that a right to same-sex marriage has taken hold to 
the point that it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply 
rooted in the history and tradition of Maryland. ,,84 In support, the 
court noted that "Congress, as well as nearly every state in the Nation, 
has taken legislative action or otherwise enacted constitutional 
amendments limiting explicitly the institution of marriage to those 
unions between a man and a woman.,,85 
The court finally addressed the state's justification for its marriage 
law.86 The court agreed "that the State's asserted interest in fostering 
procreation is a legitimate governmental interest.,,87 More 
specifically, "[i]n light of the fundamental nature of procreation, and 
the importance placed on it by the Supreme Court, safeguarding an 
environment most conducive to the stable propagation and 
continuance of the human race is a legitimate government interest.,,88 
To the court, the "'inextricable link' between marriage and procreation 
reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man 
and a woman only, because it is that relationship that is capable of 
producing biological offspring of both members (advances in 
reproductive technologies notwithstanding). ,,89 In response to the 
argument that the state could have no interest in linking marriage and 
procreation since some married couples do not have children and some 
who have children do not marry, the court explained that to comport 
with rational basis, a law "need not be drawn with mathematical 
exactitude, and may contain imperfections that result in some degree 
81 Id. at 303-04, 932 A.2d at 622. 
82 Conaway, 401 Md. 305-06, 932 A.2d 623. 
83 Id. at 307, 932 A.2d at 624. 
84 Id. at 308, 312, 932 A.2d at 625, 627. 
85 Id. at 312, 932 A.2d at 627. 
86 Id. at 315-24, 932 A.2d at 629-34. 
87 Id. at 317, 932 A.2d at 630. 
88 Conaway, 401 Md. 317, 932 A.2d 630. 
89 Id. at 318, 932 A.2d at 630-31. 
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of inequality. ,,90 Additionally, "inquiry into the ability or willingness 
of a couple actually to bear a child during marriage would violate the 
fundamental right to marital privacy.,,91 The court concluded that: 
the fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are 
conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction 
between whether various opposite-sex couples actually 
procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation. 
In such a situation, so long as the Legislature has not acted 
wholly unreasonably in granting recognition to the only 
relationship capable of bearing children traditionally within the 
marital unit [the courts are not to substitute their own judgment 
for the legislature's].92 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the 
constitutional claims and upheld Maryland's position on marriage law. 
Three judges dissented from the majority opinion.93 One did so 
only partially, arguing that while the status of marriage could be 
withheld from same-sex couples, the state ought to extend the benefits 
of marriage to them. 94 The other two would have accepted the 
absolutist take on sex discrimination.95 
IV. THE FUTURE OF INEVITABILITY 
The decision of the Circuit Court in Deane v. Conaway can serve as 
a proxy for the inevitability argument because it employs all of the 
presumptions of that argument as to the constitutional mandate for 
marriage redefinition. By contrast, the Court of Appeals decision in 
Conaway v. Deane exposes the problems with the argument. 
Briefly, the problems inherent in the inevitability argument are that 
it distorts reality and elides the very real consequences of the change it 
claims is unavoidable. These problems are linked to one another. 
In his important work of political science, Eric Voegelin described 
the tendency of ideologists in our time to merge the realm of an ideal 
utopian world with the reality of lived experience: 
90 Id. at 321-22, 932 A.2d at 633. 
91 Id., 932 A.2d at 633. 
92 Id. at 322-23, 932 A.2d at 633. 
93 Id. at 326, 932 A.2d at 635. They were Judge Raker, Judge Battaglia, and Chief Judge 
Bell. 
94 Conaway, 401 Md. 326,932 A.2d 636 (Raker, J., concurring and dissenting). 
95 See id. at 356,932 A.2d at 654 (Battaglia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 421,932 A.2d 
at 693 (Bell, c.J., dissenting). 
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[i]n the Gnostic dream world ... nonrecognition of reality is 
the fIrst principle. As a consequence, types of action which in 
the real world would be considered morally insane because of 
the real effects which they have will be considered moral in the 
dream world because they intended an entirely different effect. 
The gap between intended and real effect will be imputed not 
to the Gnostic immorality of ignoring the structure of reality 
but to the immorality of some other person or society that does 
not behave as it should behave according to the dream 
conception of cause and effect. 96 
Edmund Burke, too, was aware of this dangerous tendency and 
"regarded speculative ideology as a form of metaphysical insanity 
which totally disregarded historical experience and the depravity in 
human nature regarding the uses of political power.,,97 
The chief threats of "speculative ideology," or the new Gnosticism, 
thus derive from their need to ignore or distort reality to advance an 
invented notion of the ideal. If reality, as lived, is admitted, it will 
frustrate the ideological goal because those realities will make clear 
the goal is not achievable. If the goal is, as it so often seems to be, 
uniformitarian equality, factors that militate against the achievement 
of this goal, such as differences in capacity, must be ignored or 
repressed. Because the ideological goal is paramount, the risks 
inherent in the effort to enforce it are minimized or denied. These 
risks will include the loss of goods related to human diversity, various 
unintended consequences of change, and enforcement costs that may 
easily become increasingly steep and which will be felt as increasingly 
punitive. Having established an ideological goal, the temptation to 
pursue it "by any means necessary" is almost irresistible. 
As to this latter point, Richard Weaver has noted that the "fIrst 
step" for ideologists "is to confuse and paralyze the opposition by 
sowing widely and ostensibly" the notion that the ideological account 
of reality is the only possible account and that its eventual triumph is 
inevitable.98 Dr. Weaver continues: "[o]nce you have convinced a 
man that he cannot operate on any representation of reality but your 
96 ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 169-70 (The 
University of Chicago Press 1952). 
97 Peter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke's Legal Erudition and Practical Politics: Ireland and 
the American Revolution, 35 POL. SCI. REVIEWER 66, 70 (2006). 
98 Richard M. Weaver, On Setting the Clock Right, NATIONAL REVIEW, Oct. 12, 1957, 
available at http://www.nationalreview.comlnroriginalsl?q= 
NGU4N2ZiNWNh Y2ExZjdIMjA3Yzk2NDIyY2Q IMDA2NDE=. 
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own, you have him in a state of virtual impotence. ,,99 The challenge is 
that inevitability so rarely proves to be inevitable. "The second step is 
to regard this as nonsense as far as your own affairs go and to proceed 
to fashion the world according to your preferred concept of it. ,,100 So 
that rather than merely being a statement of historical law for the 
ideologically motivated, the claim of inevitability "is an expression of 
their will to power and their determination to overcome everything 
which stands in the way of the actualization of their dream."lol 
These observations have real application to the debate over 
marriage redefinition. The proposal that marriage must be redefined is 
the manifestation of an egalitarian ideolo~ical goal, frankly labeled by 
its proponents as "marriage equality.,,1 2 It makes short shrift of 
opposing realities such as sex difference, procreation, specifically that 
it requires one person of either sex, tradition and history, and the 
channeling function of family law whereby legal understandings 
influence actual behavior. The marriage equality principle is widely 
proclaimed to be inevitable, such that opponents are accused of being 
on the wrong side of history. 103 Any concerns about the effect of the 
change are dismissed as naIve or invidious. 
As with other claims of historical determinism, the inevitability of 
marriage equality is not so inevitable that it can be trusted to happen in 
its own time. Rather, activists feel the need to give the inevitable a 
shove forward and will do so heedless of normal restraints. The 
pursuit of the goal of marriage equality in Maryland, evidenced in the 
court decisions summarized above, illustrates this process. 
The most obvious illustration is the trial court's decision to ignore 
the reality of sex difference. 104 By treating the mere mention of the 
sex of parties to a marriage as facially discriminatory and justifying 
strict scrutiny, the court implied that the law could not even take into 
consideration the reality that men and women are not 
interchangeable. lOS Ironically, this reading would gut any attempt to 
protect women in the law because such an effort must explicitly 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 William C. Duncan, Same-Sex Couples and "The Exclusive Commitment": Untangling 
the Issues and Consequences: Marriage and the Utopian Temptation, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 
265, 272 (2007). 
103 Scott J. Anderson, Gay Republicans: GOP on 'wrong side of history,' CNN, Sept. 2, 
2008. 
104 See Deane, 2006 WL 148145; see also Md. State Bd. Of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 
270 Md. 496, 503, 312 A.2d 216,220 (1973). 
105 See Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *3. 
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recognize that there are differences and these differences have import. 
If men and women are truly interchangeable what could be wrong with 
a club consisting only of the members of one sex? Under the court's 
analysis, one could expect no substantive difference in makeup if only 
men or only women were involved. This fungibility argument has 
been consistently rejected in United States Constitutional law. 106 The 
Supreme Court has specifically allowed for differential treatment of 
men and women in laws regarding statutory rape. 107 Any law 
protecting women from discrimination based on pregnancy or against 
violence similarly recognizes this reality. lOS The Court has stated that 
"[p ]hysical differences between men and women, however, are 
enduring: 'The two sexes are not fungible; a community made up 
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of 
both. ",109 The non-ideological decision of the Court of Appeals easily 
avoided this error. 
The trial court also ignored biological differences between men and 
women. It argued that the marriage law employing a husband-wife 
definition of marriage was analogous to an earlier court decision that 
expressed J'reference for a mother raising daughters in assigning child 
custody. I I In making this analogy, however, the court failed to 
consider the obvious problem with such a decision-that it would 
separate a parent from a child; not that it would separate a female child 
from a male parent. The problem in that case was not sex segregation; 
it was disrupting a parental relationship on the basis of the sex of one 
parent. In other words, it would have been just as problematic if that 
earlier court had said the mother received custody of all sons because 
mothers do a better job parenting sons than fathers. There would be a 
fonn of sex integration in such a decision but the key problem-
disadvantaging a parent because of that parent's sex-would not have 
been addressed. Similarly, in its exclusive focus on the irrelevant 
question of parenting skills, III the trial court elided the much more 
salient reality that a child born to a married mother and father will 
usually be the child of both, while a child born to a parent in a same-
sex couple never will be the child of both members of the couple. 
106 See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (holding that men and 
women are not fungible). 
107 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2011); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
109 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193). 
110 See supra notes 34 and 43 and accompanying text. 
III See supra notes 34 and 43 and accompanying text. 
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The analysis of the trial court also distorted other realities. The 
Court of Appeals noted two of these constitutional realities in its 
rejection of the sex discrimination analysis and the suspect class 
discussion of the court below. Jl2 The trial court's curiously 
government-centered analysis of the state's interaction with marriage 
is another example of distorted understanding. The court asserted that 
Maryland was trying to advance the state's interests related to 
procreation through the "prevention of same-sex marriages.,,113 This 
is not an accurate statement of the state's posture in regard to 
marriage. In retaining the longstanding conception of marriage as the 
union of a husband and wife in its law, the court is not preventing 
same-sex couples from having relationships, even of calling these 
relationships marriages. Instead, the state is choosing to promote an 
understanding of marriage that is necessarily child-centered by 
retaining a definition that encompasses only those types of 
relationships that may result in the birth of children without third party 
participation. Prohibiting same-sex couples from making personal 
choices and promoting their choice by redefining marriage to include 
it are not the only two possibilities open to the state. 114 It may, as it 
does, choose to allow a wide realm of personal choice to same-sex 
couples while retaining formal recognition of the uniqueness of the 
male-female bond. 
The trial court's analysis distorted the public interests in marriage. 
As noted earlier, the court assumed that the legislature must have 
enacted its definition of marriage because it believed opposite-sex 
couples make better parents than same-sex couples. I IS Thus, it 
described the state interest as promoting a unit "in which the 
heterosexual parents are married.,,116 It is instructive to note how 
easily the Court of Appeals detennined that the issue was not, contrary 
to the trial court's findings, some sort of favoritism among various 
sexual arrangements. Rather, as the Court of Appeals noted, the legal 
distinction between male-female couples and other arrangements is 
based on some deep and "inextricable" realities-specifically, that "it 
is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of 
both members (advances III reproductive technologies 
112 See supra notes 44-53, 63-66 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text. 
114 See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual 
Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 545-47, 561-62 
(1983). 
115 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
116 Deane, 2006 WL 148145, at *7. 
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notwithstanding).,,1l7 A child born to a marriage of his or her parents 
is guaranteed to have a legally enforceable relationship with both 
parents. In defining marriage consistent with this reality, the law 
encourages the kinds of couples whose relationship can result in the 
birth of children. Even though having children may not be the specific 
intention of every married couple, they can commit to one another and 
their children through their union. It simultaneously encourages the 
people who create children to jointly care for them and makes real a 
legal, social, and practical tie between the child and his or her own 
parents. 
Marriage advances the state's procreation-related interest even 
when a specific married couple cannot or do not have a child. This 
couple can provide a close substitute for a child otherwise deprived of 
a relationship with his or her own biological parents and, by their 
faithfulness to their marital commitment, they do not create children 
with other people who will grow up in a fatherless or motherless 
home. Redefining marriage, by contrast, would legally enshrine an 
understanding of marriage that necessarily has nothing to do with 
children. Certainly same-sex married couples could have children, but 
this decision would have no intrinsic link to their marital status. In 
other words, redefining marriage makes even more tenuous the 
relationship between marriage and children that has already been 
stretched by cultural trends like divorce, cohabitation, and unwed 
parenting. It would thus make it impossible for marriage law to 
channel male-female sexual relations into a child-centered union. In 
fact, the state would be legally precluded from doing so because if a 
class of spouses are in a type of relationship that always and 
everywhere cannot result in children without third party participation, 
clearly the legal category of which they are a part cannot be child-
centered. In other words, enshrining a definition of marriage that 
necessarily has nothing to do with children necessarily follows a legal 
redefinition to include same sex couples. The new, adult-centered, 
understanding of marriage may provide benefits to the parties to a 
marriage, but it cannot and will not provide the basic public goods 
marriage has served. If forced to rely only on the trial court's analysis 
of the state interests in marriage, these likely costs of redefinition 
would never be clear; only the Court of Appeals decision raises them. 
Another risk inherent in the redefinition of marriage, but not 
disclosed by the triumphalist argument for same-sex marriage, is the 
risk that marriage will lose any social meaning and become merely an 
117 Conaway, 401 Md. at 318, 932 A.2d at 630-3l. 
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individualist arrangement. This is inherent in the adult-centered 
understanding of marriage that follows from redefinition. The Court 
of Appeals noted that marriage is a "public institution" in which the 
state has a valid interest. 118 Again, this point would have been missed 
in the more ideological account of the trial court. 
Specifically, endorsing a redefinition of marriage would mean 
endorsing a purely contractual understanding of marriage, since it 
involves no larger social interests, only the interests of the adult 
parties. It is true that the adoption of no-fault divorce has moved the 
states much closer to this kind of understanding, but same-sex 
marriage would largely complete the transition. Same-sex marriage 
merges the public and intimate spheres by conferring public 
recognition not on the basis of social goods like responsible 
procreation but on purely private choices. It makes marriage a 
contingent belonging-a linking of two autonomous individuals as an 
action of will. The displaced understanding of marriage certainly 
involves an element of choice, but the realities of biology, sexual 
complementarity, and the dependence and vulnerability that come with 
pregnancy make it impossible to speak of much of what is experienced 
in marriage between a man and a woman as freely chosen. As F.R. 
Bradley noted, "[m]arriage is a contract, a contract to pass out of the 
sphere of contract.,,119 The initial choice of marriage creates 
obligations and liabilities, as well as joys and opportunities, which are 
not properly understood as bargained for. If we continue to embrace a 
purely contingent notion of marriage we will see a continued "waning 
of belonging" which ignores "the organic correlations between 
autonomy and dependence, which lies at the heart of human 
existence.,,120 To legally enshrine the concept of contingent belonging 
as the sine qua non of marriage is what redefining marriage to center it 
entirely on adult choice would do. 
As discussed above, inevitability seems often to need a push. In 
many states, that shove has come from State Attorneys General who 
decline to defend marriage laws so as to prevent courts from grappling 
with (or to allow courts so inclined to ignore) the real consequences of 
changing the definition of marriage. It can also be supplied by courts 
118 Id. at 303-04, 932 A.2d at 622. 
119 Francis Herbert Bradley, Ethical Studies, reprinted in CONSERVATIVE TEXTS: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 58 n.1 (Roger Scruton ed., 1991). 
120 Akira Morita, Amae and Belonging-An Encounter of the Japanese Psyche and the 
Waning of Belonging in America, 8 (2001), http://www.law2.byu.eduJorganizations/ 
marriage _ family/past_ conferences/feb20 11/drafis/Morita%20Akira, %20Amae%20and%20 
Belonging,%202011.%201.%2020.pdf. 
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who inappropriately apply subjective legal standards like rationality to 
avoid them. If a court labels a practice irrational, what recourse do 
citizens have? They can hope that a higher court, as in the case of 
Maryland, will correct the mistake, but this is not always possible. 
The argument from inevitability seeks purposely to prevent the 
possibility of correction of a mistaken analysis of the costs of same-
sex marriage. Professor Weaver explains that "[i]f you teach a 
representation of man which pictures him as nothing more than a cork 
bobbing on the surface of forces he cannot control, you may expect 
him to default on his responsibilities.,,121 If the drumbeat of 
inevitability begins to intimidate opponents of the change from 
expressing their opposition, as it is indeed intended to do, one can 
expect them to default on their responsibility to safeguard marriage. If 
on the other hand, the partisans of same-sex marriage "should admit 
that this future" of inevitable marriage redefinition: 
is only their subjective feeling which they are determined to 
objectify, they [will be] bound to show that it is somehow 
better or more deserving of realization than that espoused by 
the other side. In this case they will have to abandon any 
argument based on our presumptive inability to tum the clock 
back. For they are now conceding that there is no order which 
will come necessarily with the passage of time; there are only 
contemplated and willed orders; we can have one or another, 
and our choice must take us back to some standard of values 
about which men can differ. 122 
v. CONCLUSION 
Proponents of marriage redefinition failed in their first attempt to 
impose the inevitable, or what they claim is inevitable, on the state of 
Maryland through litigation. As this article is being written, they are 
now attempting to do so by using the legislative process. While 
unsuccessful this past legislative session, only time will tell if 
marriage redefinition proponents will be successful through the 
legislature. 
A careful application of the law prevented the redefinition of 
marriage in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. That court 
appropriately resisted the idea that the state's constitution required a 
redefinition of marriage. In doing so, the Court of Appeals resisted the 
121 Weaver, supra note 98. 
122 Jd. 
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distorting effect of the argument that same-sex marriage is a basic 
human right, the denial of which is everywhere and always a 
manifestation of atavistic bigotry. It allowed the consensus of 
millennia of human experience to stand because the court was willing 
to recognize that this consensus reflected realities of human life, the 
denial of which would have consequences. 
The legislature is being encouraged to do the opposite-to pretend 
that there are no differences between men and women and to accept 
that any recognition of these differences and their very real 
consequences for children and society would be to derogate a human 
right. Members of the legislature are being told that they will be on 
the wrong side of history if they do not redefine marriage so as to 
include any two persons. 
Whatever happens in the legislature, it is helpful that the Maryland 
courts have taken steps to clarify the stakes. 
Marriage is, as the Court of Appeals noted, a social institution. As 
such, to adopt the words Edmund Burke used to describe 
constitutional liberties, it is part of an "entailed inheritance derived to 
us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity.,,123 
In Bleak House, an inheritance was dissipated in litigation. 11 that 
novel, the expectations of possible beneficiaries to a will were 
disappointed when the costs of the litigation entirely consumed the 
estate that was in dispute. The ongoing litigation to redefine marriage 
threatens the same result. If the arguments rejected by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland are eventually accepted in the legislature or in 
other courts, the social significance of marriage could be extinguished 
only to be replaced with an empty le§al construct meant only to ratify 
the relationship choices of adults. 12 Such an outcome would also 
frustrate the expectations of children that they will be able to grow up 
in a world where their rightful inheritance, the opportunity for a 
relationship with a mother and father, will be secured. 
123 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 119 (penguin Classics 
1986)(1790). 
124 A change, moreover, likely to frustrate even the expectations of adults, who may feel 
their own marriages devalued if they are essentially the legal equivalent of a cell phone 
contract (albeit easier to escape from). 
